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Abstract 
 
In recent years public order policing policy in England and Wales has undergone significant 
changes. A ‘human rights compliant’ model of protest policing has been developed since 2009 
and this article makes a contribution to the body of academic work considering the impact of 
these changes on operational policing. Drawing upon a longitudinal case study of the policing 
of protests against ‘fracking’ in Salford, Greater Manchester, in 2013-2014, the article 
contrasts post-2009 policy and academic discourses on protest policing with the experiences 
of anti-fracking protesters. To develop this assessment, the article also draws attention to 
previously unexplored definitions of acceptable and unacceptable protest set out by police in 
more recent policy, and considers the extent to which these definitions are reflected in the 
police response to anti-fracking protest. The article suggests that a police commitment to a 
human rights approach to protest facilitation is, at least in the case of anti-fracking protest, 
contingent on the focus and form of political activism.  
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Following the death of Ian Tomlinson, a forty-seven year-old newspaper vendor, at protests 
against the G20 meeting in London in 2009, a number of changes were proposed to public 
order policing in England and Wales. A new ‘human rights compliant’ framework for public 
order policing, based on dialogue, communication, and a commitment to ‘facilitating’ peaceful 
protest, was proposed as a necessary response to help the police service ‘adapt to the modern 
day demands of public order policing’ (HMIC 2009: 27). Senior police officers accepted the 
requirement for change and emphasised the need for police to engage, and establish dialogue, 
with protesters in public order situations and for senior commanders to be able to ‘demonstrate 
consideration and application of relevant human rights principles’ (ACPO 2010: 11). This new 
approach to protest policing, based on compliance with the Human Rights Act 1998 (ACPO 
2010; HMIC 2009; JCHR 2009), led to the introduction of new policing initiatives, the most 
notable of which was the introduction of Police Liaison Teams [PLTs] whose role is to liaise 
with protesters before, during, and after protest events. The role of the PLT is to build links 
between police, protest organisers and protesters through the establishment of dialogue and 
relationships based on trust. The Metropolitan Police’s Standard Operating Procedure on PLTs 
explains that their aim is to ‘reduce tension and the risk of disorder’ (Morgan 2013: 1). PLTs 
therefore are understood to play a key role in ‘reducing disorder, facilitating peaceful protest 
and balancing human rights’ (Smith, 2015: 25).  
 
The nature of police responses to protest in England and Wales has been the subject of long-
standing debates among observers of public order policing. Over the last forty years, competing 
views about these responses, and their trajectory, have been advanced and debated against the 
backdrop of arguments about the nature, and extent, of changes in policing more broadly (PAJ 
Waddington 1993; Jefferson 1993; Bayley and Shearing 1996; Jones and Newburn 2002; 
Reiner 1998). In the 1970s and 1980s a significant body of work emerged that sought to 
highlight the repressive function of public order policing alongside a growing militarisation of 
police responses to political protest (Bunyan 1977; Fine and Millar 1985; Jefferson 1990; 
McCabe et al. 1988; Scraton 1985). In this period, core principles in criminal justice have been 
radically transformed, as security has become the central focus in criminal justice policy in the 
UK and other liberal democracies (Zedner 2009). The securitisation of criminal justice (Zedner  
2016), intensified since the 1990s but most notably in the 21st century, has seen a logic of risk 
and precaution come to define criminal justice policy (Zedner 2009). Policing and broader 
criminal justice practices have thus been reconfigured by the imperative of security and a 
fundamental shift in the politics of law and order (Reiner 2007). A significant extension of 
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police powers (Reiner 2010) and the growth of surveillance (Coleman and McCahill 2011) 
have both been justified on the basis of a belief that certain ‘suspect’ populations pose a threat 
to security and good order in contemporary society. The policing of Muslim communities in 
this period (Kundnani 2014) as well as recent revelations about the undercover policing of 
political activity (Lubbers 2012; Evans and Lewis 2013; Smith and Chamberlain 2015) 
demonstrate that policing has retained a central concern with managing those defined as 
disorderly. However, despite the continued trajectory of criminal justice policy, in the last 
twenty years a number of scholars in Europe and America have argued that there has been a 
major change in the dominant style of protest policing away from the repressive models which 
defined previous decades (della Porta and Reiter 1998; McPhail et al 1998; D Waddington 
2007; PAJ Waddington 1994, 1995, 2003).  
 
Recent research on developments in public order policing 
 
The idea that a repressive approach to public order policing in the UK has been superseded has 
been reiterated in a number of recent studies that have sought to consider the impact of changes 
to policy made since 2009. In responding to the need, outlined by Gorringe, Stott and Rosie 
(2012), for research to contribute to ‘direct empirical ‘testing’ of the new HMIC reforms within 
police operational practice’ (2012: 114), these studies have made a series of important 
arguments about the nature of contemporary protest policing in the UK. In the first instance, 
this research has argued that there has been a substantive shift in public order policing since 
2009 to a model clearly based on human rights principles structured around a commitment on 
the part of police to facilitation and dialogue. Secondly, this body of research has suggested 
that central to these changes has been the successful and effective introduction of Protest 
Liaison Officers [PLOs]. This is made possible because PLOs are understood to adopt a ‘‘non-
repressive’ approach before, during and after crowd events to establish relationships of trust 
with protesters’ (Stott et al 2013: 214). It is suggested that the development of this 
‘communications-oriented approach to protest policing’ (Waddington 2013: 48) is central to 
the notable changes on the ground. For Gorringe et al for example, PLOs are ‘no isolated 
innovation but part of a wider UK move toward proactive and dialogue-based policing’ (2012: 
122).  
 
Thirdly, for many of these observers, the continued progress of dialogue policing requires 
enhanced communication between police and protesters. A number of these studies have 
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recognised that there can be difficulties in establishing relationships of trust with certain ‘types’ 
of protesters (Stott et al, 2013; Gorringe and Rosie, 2013; Gorringe et al 2012). A negotiated 
management approach to protest policing ‘requires demonstrators to be willing to talk to police’ 
and have ‘representatives with requisite authority to enter into negotiation’ (King and 
Waddington in Gorringe and Rosie 2013: 2). There is an acceptance that dialogue policing may 
not be capable of overcoming the fact that so-called ‘transgressive protesters’ see the police as 
‘part of the system’. Work on transgressive protest – by those that ‘articulate more abstract 
demands, use unpredictable and often illegal tactics, do not negotiate with police, and are 
generally younger’ (Tilly in Gillham 2011: 640) – in the US has suggested that the tactics, 
organisational structure, and decision-making processes employed by some protest groups has 
posed a significant challenge to police (Gillham 2011; Gillham and Noakes 2007; Gillham, 
Edwards and Noakes 2013). In the US, police have responded with what Patrick Gillham and 
colleagues have referred to as a ‘strategic incapacitation’ approach, a selective use of repressive 
techniques through which ‘bad’ transgressive protesters are isolated or neutralised as threats to 
security to prevent disruption (Gillham 2011). An unwillingness to engage with police and the 
adoption of tactics that transcend legal and cultural norms pose a clear challenge to a police 
view of protest facilitation premised on negotiation and agreement. However, in the UK, it has 
been argued that if this hostility to police on the part of transgressive protesters is accepted, 
and some disruption is tolerated, the new approach to public order policing still has the 
potential to ‘improve mutual understanding and reduce the potential for violence between 
police and protesters’ (Gorringe and Rosie 2013: 7).  
In this article we offer our own response to the call for direct empirical testing of the new HMIC 
reforms. We have previously argued that, despite these reforms, public order policing in 
England and Wales remains highly discretionary (Gilmore, Jackson and Monk, 2016) and we 
have also suggested that protests against hydraulic fracturing – better known as ‘fracking’ – 
are of particular significance to an assessment of current public order policing policy and 
practice (Gilmore, Jackson and Monk 2017). Our research has demonstrated that these 
protesters have experienced both a ‘velvet glove’ and ‘iron fist’ of public order policing as 
dialogue policing strategies have been deployed alongside, rather than in place of, coercive 
strategies of mass arrest (Gilmore et al, 2017). Providing a detailed case study of the policing 
of this type of protest, this article develops this work and suggests that recent developments in 
police policy specifically linked to anti-fracking protests – not reflected in recent academic 
work in this area – are significant in an assessment of police responses to protest in England 
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and Wales. The political, social and economic context in which the anti-fracking movement 
has emerged has made these protests particularly contentious (Jackson, Monk and Gilmore, 
2017) and we suggest therefore, that the development of specific policy in this context is 
significant not least because of what it reveals about the police view of contemporary protest. 
 
Presenting data from a longitudinal study of the policing of protests against fracking at Barton 
Moss, Salford, in Greater Manchester, which took place between November 2013 and April 
2014, the article seeks to consider the extent to which policing practice in this context reflects 
the police view of acceptable and unacceptable protest set out in recent policy. The article 
begins therefore, by exploring recent policy documents specifically related to anti-fracking 
protest before presenting our detailed case study of the policing at Barton Moss. This case study 
was conducted independently of police for methodological reasons explained below and 
through this case study we suggest that there is a need for researchers to consider more directly 
the experiences of protesters in an assessment of changes to public order policing. We argue 
specifically that there is a need, rarely acknowledged in policy and academic debates, to 
consider the experiences of hard to reach groups of protesters, including those involved in 
direct action protest. This article therefore provides an empirical test of HMIC reforms, and an 
example of the evolving approach of police to anti-fracking protests in England and Wales.  
 
Police policy relating to anti-fracking protest 
 
“Fracking”, or hydraulic fracturing, is the process of extracting shale gas from solid rock below 
the earth’s surface, by pumping water, sand and chemicals at high pressure into the rock. In the 
last decade, technological advances, initially developed predominantly in the US, have been 
exported around the globe and energy companies have turned their attention to Europe, and the 
deposits of shale gas that have been identified across the continent. In the UK, significant shale 
deposits have been identified, and exploratory drilling by a developing onshore oil and gas 
industry has been actively encouraged by UK governments since 2007. The central place 
fracking now occupies in UK energy policy has been secured most markedly since 2013 when, 
in David Cameron’s terms, the UK government began its drive to go ‘all out for shale’ (Watt 
2014). Shale gas has been lauded by government for its ability to provide energy security, 
growth and jobs, and fracking has been actively promoted alongside changes to energy and 
environmental policies since 2015 which have seen a declining commitment to renewable 
energy (Harvey 2016) and a reversal of policies on climate change (Clark 2015).  
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In May 2011 the first UK exploration for shale gas using hydraulic fracturing, at Preese Hall 
in Lancashire, was suspended after the process triggered two minor earthquakes and these 
events, combined with the economic, social and political context in which fracking has become 
central to UK energy policy (Jackson et al, 2017), have meant that exploratory drilling around 
the UK has been controversial. Communities and environmental groups have raised concerns 
about the immediate impact on local natural environments, including land, air, and water 
pollution as well as the broader issue of maintaining a reliance on fossil fuels in the face of 
global climate change, and public support for fracking in the UK has declined steadily as its 
place in energy policy has been elevated (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy 2017). Since 2013, drilling operations have been accompanied by protests which have 
often sought to disrupt and delay drilling operations. The first major protests against fracking 
in England and Wales came in the summer of 2013 at Balcombe, Sussex, where a coalition of 
local groups and environmental campaigners established a protest camp at the exploratory 
drilling site run by energy company Cuadrilla. 
 
In 2015, in response to these protests, the National Police Chiefs Council [NPCC] produced 
specific guidance on policing protests against fracking (ACPO 2015i). The aim of this guidance 
was to draw upon lessons learnt in the policing of protests against fracking and it provides 
twenty-seven recommendations for change that include emphases on police communication 
strategies as well as operational planning and management. The ultimate goal of the guidance 
was to work toward a ‘consistent approach to the policing of onshore oil and gas operations’ 
(ACPO 2015: 1) but this guidance arguably provides an insight into the way in which public 
order policing policy in the UK is developing specifically in response to anti-fracking protest. 
 
In this sense, the most notable inclusion to this guidance is an explanation of what is referred 
to as the ‘Structure of Protest’ (ACPO 2015: 7) and this includes a diagram (Figure 1) which 
demonstrates, what is in the police view, ‘the basic positioning of individuals within protest 
and the level of actions attributable to each category’ (ACPO 2015: 7). 
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Figure 1 – The Structure of Protest, taken from ACPO (2015) Policing linked to Onshore Oil 
and Gas Operations, London: National Police Chief’s Council, 8. 
 
 
The diagram and explanation are included as part of a discussion about the benefits of 
establishing good relationships with protesters and local supporters at anti-fracking protests, in 
line with the commitment to dialogue. The breakdown of the structure of protest here though 
defines protest in terms of accepted tactics in distinction to activism defined by criminality. 
Here the divide between these groups mirrors the distinction drawn between ‘contained’ and 
transgressive protest that Gillham (2011) argues has been central to targeted protest policing in 
the US in recent years. Indeed, the Network for Police Monitoring [Netpol] have pointed out, 
‘the guidance proposes that these categorisations will be used to ‘tailor’ police responses’ 
(2015a: 9).   
 
The police explanation of the ‘structure of protest’, is developed further in training materials 
produced specifically for PLOs by the College of Policing, the professional body for policing 
in England and Wales. The training materials, released under the Freedom Information Act 
(Statewatch 2013), provide further detail on the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ protesters 
which again reflects the definition of transgressive protest defined by both the demands made 
and the tactics employed. 
8 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – College of Policing (n.d.) Protester Tactics: An Introduction for Police Liaison 
Teams 
 
In this guidance – notably given to those officers directly responsible for establishing 
relationships with those involved in protest – attempts to move beyond purely symbolic 
gestures, and a direct opposition to the political and social order, are seemingly placed beyond 
the pale.  
 
Anti-fracking protest, as it has evolved in England since 2013, has transcended the category of 
‘protest’ as defined by police due its demands and the tactics employed by protesters (as the 
case study in the latter part of this article illustrates). In the terms defined above, anti-fracking 
protest is transgressive and there is evidence that this has been interpreted by police as a key 
example of not only ‘activism’ but also ‘extremism’. Anti-fracking protest has been labelled as 
‘extremism’ in police training sessions for public sector workers provided under the 
government’s Prevent counter-extremism programme (Bloom 2015). Furthermore, individual 
anti-fracking protesters have been referred to the government’s de-radicalisation programme 
(NetPol 2015b) and counter-terrorism police have been directly involved in the policing of 
anti-fracking activists (NetPol 2015c). However, the potential effect of these definitions on 
public order policing practice has not been considered in existing academic literature and this 
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article seeks to respond to this gap. The purpose of the case study set out below is therefore to 
provide an empirical test of recent reforms and to consider whether the framing of anti-fracking 
in police policy can be seen to be having an effect on operational policing. 
 
The Barton Moss Community Protection Camp (BMCPC) 
 
The news that energy company IGas Energy would begin exploratory drilling to explore for 
coal bed methane and other unconventional gas resources at Barton Moss in mid-November 
2013, prompted concerned residents from Salford and the wider Greater Manchester area, as 
well as some from further afield, to set up a camp at the site. Over the period of protest, between 
November 2013 and April 2014, the camp established itself as a community-led protection 
camp, a non-hierarchical unit with no leader or centre that was sustained by support and 
donations of food, fuel and general supplies from people living in the local area. As the protest 
progressed the camp grew in numbers and while people from around the UK visited, stayed at 
the camp and took part in the protests, the majority of people involved lived locally or in the 
North West of England. Other members of the local community in Salford and Greater 
Manchester more generally also demonstrated support for the camp and an opposition to 
fracking by attending events organised at the camp on weekends and two large public 
demonstrations against fracking that took place in Manchester and Salford during the period of 
the protest. The protest involved approximately equal numbers of men and women and a wide 
age-range from infants in pushchairs and school children attending with parents through to 
elderly men and women who attended to both support the camp and to take part in the protests. 
Those involved adopted several protest techniques, including the use of lock-onsii and 
blockades, but relied most heavily on slow walking in front of convoys of trucks arriving at, 
and departing from, the IGas site in order to delay the drilling operation and to provide a visible 
and constant opposition to fracking in Salford. These slow walk protests took place twice daily 
for four days per week, for the duration of the drilling operation. The camp remained in situ 
until mid-April 2014 with the protest covering approximately twenty weeks and involving over 
seventy-five protest events.  
 
Data sources and methods 
 
The authors made a series of visits to the BMCPC to engage in fieldwork and undertake semi-
structured interviews with camp residents and those taking part in direct action. One or more 
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of the three authors visited the camp to conduct interviews or observations on fifteen separate 
occasions. These interviews were supplemented with follow-up interviews conducted at the 
conclusion of the criminal proceedings (two years later) as part of a longitudinal study into the 
policing at Barton Moss and subsequent criminal justice responses to those arrested (Gilmore, 
et al 2016). The primary objective of the research was to uncover the experiences of policing 
at Barton Moss from the perspectives of the protestors, therefore qualitative semi-structured 
interviews were the chosen method. This method was chosen in line with the aim to centralise 
and project unrecognised voices and to facilitate the production of a view from below (Jefferson 
1987). In total twenty-two interviews were conducted involving twenty-seven participants. 
These interviews provide in-depth, first-person accounts of people’s experiences of the protest 
at Barton Moss and detail their perspectives on the policing of the protest. Purposive sampling 
was undertaken; the authors approached members of the camp directly to seek participation 
after initial discussions with gatekeepers from the Justice4Barton Moss campaign. Sixteen men 
and eleven women were interviewed and the age of participants ranged from eighteen to 
seventy. This research took the form of an in-depth longitudinal case study analysis that was 
conducted independently of police. This independence was necessary to enable the authors to 
engage with hard to reach groups of protesters who, due to their negative experiences of 
policing, were reluctant to engage with researchers who had links with police.  
 
The interview data was supplemented by Freedom of Information Act responses from Greater 
Manchester Police, the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Greater Manchester, 
the Independent Police Complaints Commission, the Crown Prosecution Service and the 
Ministry of Justice. The data drawn from the interviews and the Freedom of Information Act 
requests was triangulated with other publicly available information, including GMP press 
statements and a report on the Barton Moss protest published in October 2014 by the Police 
and Crime Commissioner for Greater Manchester’s Independent Panel on the Policing of 
Protests and Demonstrations [PCC Panel] (2014).  
   
Police operational planning  
 
The police operation conducted by GMP, codenamed Operation Geraldton, ran for the duration 
of the drilling operation at Barton Moss and cost in excess of £1.7m. By the conclusion of the 
protest, there had been 231 arrests (relating to 115 individuals) and 77 complaints to GMP, 
40% of which related to the misuse of force by GMP officers (Gilmore et al, 2016). The 
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policing operation was presented by GMP as a balancing act with the police finding themselves 
“stuck in the middle” (Fahy 2014) compelled to respect the protesters’ basic human right to 
protest and the right of the fracking company to conduct the exploratory drilling for which it 
had been granted a licence. However, the contents of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
signed between GMP, IGas, and other ‘interested parties’, prior to the commencement of the 
protest, raised questions about the independence of GMP in their role at Barton Moss. The 
purpose of the MOU was:  
 
…to articulate the basis and general principles for ongoing cooperation and 
coordination between the Parties in order to promote and contribute to the realisation 
of their mutual interests in relation to the delivery of the Gold strategy (GMP 2013a: 
3). 
  
Despite GMP’s stated commitment to balancing what were presented as equally valid rights 
claims, protesters were not included as one of the parties with ‘mutual interests’ in the delivery 
of the Gold strategyiii and were not approached in the production of the MOU. On the other 
hand, the MOU demonstrates that IGas had insider access to Gold and Silver senior police 
command meetings, daily briefings or video conferences with GMP’s Silver Commander and 
shared police and local council information and intelligence, all privileges not extended to 
protesters. Furthermore, the MOU demonstrates that IGas took a lead in all media 
communications, “both proactive and reactive”’ (GMP 2013a: 10) in liaison with GMP’s 
Corporate Communications team. The MOU at Barton Moss mirrored very closely a similar 
document produced at Balcombe (NetPol 2014) and both formalised links between the police, 
the local council, the energy company and the land owner without any involvement of 
protesters or campaign groups. These documents illustrate that accepted view of necessary 
‘cooperation and coordination’ involves the state and interested corporations but does not 
include the affected community or those seeking to oppose the drilling. Specifically, the 
existence of these memoranda brings into question the idea of police organisational neutrality 
and, as we have argued (Gilmore et al, 2017), it directly challenges the idea, suggested by Stott 
et al (2013: 225), that police in the UK ‘invariably start their planning from a position of 
negotiated management’. 
 
Liaison and communication  
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GMP prides itself on being a centre of excellence for the management of public disorder and 
has been a leading force in the pilot training programme for Liaison Officers (GMP 2013b). 
However, dialogue was not effectively established at Barton Moss, and for the duration of the 
protest, officers and protesters were not able to establish either meaningful communication or 
points of agreement about the management of daily marches. For GMP, this lack of dialogue 
was a result of a refusal by protesters to engage with police. GMP explained to the PCC Panel 
that dialogue and negotiation had been attempted by officers at Barton Moss but ‘GMP felt 
some protesters acted in a cynical way and had no real desire to negotiate with police’ (PCC 
Panel 2014: 17). 
 
GMP and the PCC Panel concluded that this refusal to communicate effectively was due to the 
unwillingness of the purposely non-hierarchical camp to elect an official spokesperson and a 
more general unwillingness on the part of protesters to engage with the police. However, 
despite speaking to a representative of the group, the PCC Panel failed to acknowledge that 
one of the key local campaign groups, Frack Free Greater Manchester, had tried to play a liaison 
role at Barton Moss, and GMP had refused to meet with them (Frack Free Greater Manchester 
2014). In addition, the PCC Panel did not acknowledge that communication and negotiation 
had been attempted by protesters such as Maria:  
 
We found that in the past we tried to make some kind of agreements and the police have 
always broken them first. Like, they make an agreement to say, “Oh, well, this time 
round you can march without police, we’ll just give you two PLOs. You can march the 
lorries just on your own.” Five minutes in – this was the other week – they just sent the 
bobbies out anyway because they think… they say, “Oh, you’re walking too slow, we 
have to put the police out.” (Maria, Protester) 
 
In this example, in the view of the protesters, attempts were made to enter into negotiations but 
the response of police suggested that a commitment to meaningful dialogue was not 
reciprocated. For many protesters, the direct experience of policing at Barton Moss was 
sufficient to induce a hesitance, or reluctance, to engage with the police. For others their 
experience at other protests, especially at Balcombe, was sufficient to dissuade them from 
engaging with officers. There is also little doubt that, what were at the time, very recent 
revelations about the policing of protest and campaign groups in the UK (Evans and Lewis 
2013), which included the use of police infiltration and undercover police officers forming 
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long-term sexual relationships with women activists with a notable emphasis on environmental 
groups, had an effect on the willingness of many protesters to engage with police.  
 
The PLOs, with whom responsibility for establishing dialogue lay, were perceived to be 
primarily involved in gathering intelligence, as Sam explained: 
 
The role, if anything, is to be information gathering. Because they’d come have a chat 
with us, as soon as the walk starts they’re off on their own in a group. Before a walk 
and after a walk they’ll have a little chat with us and see if anything was alright and 
say, “We’ll put it back to the bosses.” Obviously nothing ever changes, so they’re 
obviously only here for information-gathering, really (Sam, Protester).  
 
This apparent function exacerbated the lack of trust between protesters and the police, and also 
reinforced suspicions held by many of the protesters about the role of PLOs, suspicions again 
undoubtedly exacerbated by the public accounts of police infiltration of protest groups. The 
perception of PLOs as intelligence gatherers is not unique to Barton Moss, as Gorringe et al 
have noted (2011) and the intelligence gathering role, or at very least the protesters’ perception 
of this role, coloured the interactions between many protesters and PLOs at Barton Moss.  
 
Police representation of the protesters and the policing operation 
 
Throughout the duration of Operation Geraldton, GMP issued public statements, published 
news items on the GMP website, and provided commentaries through the Chief Constable’s 
own blog. The dominant concern of police spokespersons appeared to lie with justifying the 
policing operation, including, notably, the use of force, rather than providing effective 
communication with the protesters or the public. To do this, the police narrative reproduced an 
image of protesters as unreasonable in both their demands and their behaviour. A number of 
statements made by the Silver commander, Chief Superintendent Mark Roberts, in particular, 
appeared to reinforce an image of anti-fracking protesters as irrational in their opposition to 
both fracking and the policing of the protest. The idea that some of those involved were 
experienced protesters was repeatedly highlighted in police statements, and used to infer a lack 
of affinity between the local anti-fracking campaign and those who had travelled to Barton 
Moss. In public statements Roberts sought to draw a direct distinction between the protesters 
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and local residents, and in doing so located concerns with the policing of the protest outside of 
the local community: 
 
It now seems that the majority of people who are arriving at the site are not there to 
protest against fracking but are there to disrupt and intimidate the local community and 
to antagonise police (in Manchester Evening News  2014). 
 
Generalisations about who ‘the local community’ were, and whether they were in support of, 
or opposed to, the protest, were central to competing narratives provided by protesters and 
GMP. In their contribution to the PPC Panel report GMP positioned local residents in 
opposition to the protest, highlighting reports of disruption and intimidation of residents by 
protesters (PCC Panel 2014). However, the apparent conflict between the protest and the local 
community was not reflected in the accounts collected by the authors or by many journalists 
visiting the site (see Pidd 2013). The idea that individuals from outside of the ‘locality’ were 
illegitimate protesters was a recurring theme in GMP statements despite being undermined by 
their own arrest figures which demonstrated that at the time these statements were made, 75% 
of arrestees were from the North West of England or had no fixed address (Gilmore et al, 2016). 
The lack of legitimacy for those who had travelled to the protest appeared to rest on the 
assumption that fracking at Barton Moss should be solely an issue for people living locally. 
Given the far-reaching nature of the highlighted environmental impacts of fracking, defining 
fracking as a ‘local’ issue appeared to be part of an attempt to shape the public perception of 
the protest and the protesters.  
 
It appeared that the representation of protest by GMP sought to reinforce a construction of the 
protesters as illegitimate and on this basis to justify the policing operation (Gilmore et al, 2016). 
The image of the protest at Barton Moss reflected a view of anti-fracking protest as 
unacceptable, and echoed the view, articulated by both government and the fracking industry 
in the UK, that opposition to fracking is itself irrational (Jackson et al, 2017). The overarching 
themes that characterised GMP’s communications strategy, of justifying the police operation 
and questioning the legitimacy of the protest, did not appear to be in line with a commitment 
to facilitation, but instead appeared to rest upon a construction of the protest as illegitimate.  
 
Police repression  
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The conduct of GMP officers throughout the course of Operation Geraldton raised further 
concerns about the police role. Many of the more experienced protesters interviewed cited the 
policing at Barton Moss as the most brutal that they had witnessed. Antagonistic methods of 
harassment were outlined by many of the protestors and Tim’s account is illustrative of these 
reports: 
 
I tried to raise it with the Chief Inspector this morning…I’m walking along at what I 
am agreeing is a reasonable pace, I’m being compliant with them, and they are 
agreeing it’s a reasonable pace, and yet repeatedly, about once a second, they shouted 
very loudly in each of my ears, ‘keep moving, please keep moving’. I’m trying to 
square that with our peaceful protest because over a 45 minute period, that’s quite a 
harassment. And so I ask them to say it a little more quietly and, of course, they say 
it louder next time. That’s important, even at that base level. They are determined no 
peaceful protest is going to happen (Tim, Protester). 
 
The twice daily protests, walking the trucks into and off the site, for at least four days a week, 
over a five month period, were unprecedented for those taking part. The intensity of this form 
of protest was exacerbated by the inconsistency of how these marches would play out on a 
daily basis. The running battle between the protesters and the police revolved around the length 
of time taken to travel the 800 metre stretch of road from the main arterial route to the drilling 
site; this could take up to several hours or as little as fifteen minutes, and this added to the 
uncertainty for those taking part, as Maria explained: 
 
One day we could actually just peacefully and calmly be walking down the road and 
be allowed to walk down the road, and other times we’ll just be shoved, pushed and 
beaten, and we just never know what kind of day it’s going to be (Maria, Protester). 
 
It was predominantly during the walk-ins that protesters also reported being physically handled 
by the police. They described the frequent occurrence of being pushed and shoved, having their 
heels stood on, having knuckles dug into their backs, being grabbed around the waist and 
pushed down the road, and being verbally harassed:  
 
The knuckles in the back, stepping on people’s feet, stepping on people’s heels; it’s 
quite deliberate. I’ve told them many times that it’s a peaceful protest and there is no 
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need for it, but they just carry on doing it – telling me to march faster. I’m clearly 
moving, I’m clearly within my normal right to keep moving, and they just keep 
assaulting me and assaulting other people (James, Protester). 
 
For those interviewed this violence significantly escalated when Tactical Aid Unit [TAU] 
officers from GMP’s Police Support Unit were deployed to cover the marches. The TAU were, 
according to Fahy, available to help regular officers with ‘unusual incidents’ (Fahy 2014) but 
as the protest went on, these officers were involved on a regular basis. The use of force by TAU 
officers at Barton Moss marked them out from other officers, and the normalisation of their 
deployment typified the policing of the protest for many of those involved:  
 
As soon as they bring in the TAU it changes dramatically – people are getting injured, 
severe injuries have happened. They’ve thrown us down the road, pretty much. The 
tactics totally change; the atmosphere changes (Sam, Protester). 
 
Interviewees described the tactic of mass arrest as having a particularly brutalising and 
destabilising effect on camp residents (see Gilmore et al 2016, 2017). In addition, while those 
interviewed were clear about the support received by the camp from people in the local 
community, some did suggest that the policing had the effect of deterring people from joining 
the protest. This became notable for some, such as Lee, as the dominant image of violent 
policing, led by the TAU, was reinforced during the course of the police operation: 
 
Yeah, we’ve definitely noticed a decline of locals over the last month or so, especially 
with the police stepping up their pushing and shoving. We’ve had less of the locals 
on-site. Obviously I can't prove it, but my personal opinion is the way the police are 
dealing with it, and to a lot of people it does, you know, especially people who have 
kids and things, they were being threatened by social services and stuff like that. So 
to anyone who would come down, would they want to risk that? (Lee, Protester).  
 
The risk of violent policing was combined here, for Lee and others, with the additional risks to 
protesters who attended with children following visits to the camp by social services. Citing 
“safeguarding” concerns for children involved, Greater Manchester social services visited the 
camp in November 2013 (see Netpol 2016) and this was perceived by many of the protesters 
as an attempt to widen the policing of the protest.   
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GMP’s professed impartiality was questioned in the light of the conduct of officers and in the 
light of public statements made by official GMP spokespeople that sought to underplay the 
complaints made by those involved (see Gilmore et al, 2016). Complaints against GMP officers 
during Operation Geraldton included `aggressive behaviour', `unnecessary force', `abusive 
language', `insulting behaviour', `improper treatment', and being `denied legal advice', but 
many of the interviewees also explained that they didn’t make formal complaints about their 
experience at Barton Moss because of a lack of trust and confidence in the police complaints 
system. The experiences protesters reported of the policing of daily marches and the police 
misrepresentation of the protest suggested that the approach taken by GMP at Barton Moss was 
not in-line with the new approach to public order policing recommended by HMIC. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The experience at Barton Moss appears to demonstrate that the commitment to dialogue and 
facilitation on the part of police is not universal. Where researchers have been able to state 
clearly that protest policing has been ‘relatively permissive and enlightened’ (D Waddington 
2013: 63), and ‘fundamentally democratic’ (Gorringe, Stott and Rosie 2012: 123) it is in 
response to protest that conforms largely to the police definition of what is acceptable. Where 
protesters desire no more than to make a symbolic register of opposition and engage with police 
in the expected manner, the approach to facilitation can play out as the post-2009 policy 
dictates. The Barton Moss protest demonstrates however, that despite assurances to the 
contrary in the academic literature, transgressive protest does pose a significant challenge to 
the idea of a reformed approach to public order policing in England and Wales. It is important 
therefore to consider how, in current police policy, strategies for liaison and negotiation are 
developing in conjunction with ideas about what constitutes legitimate forms of protest.  
 
The Barton Moss case study illustrates that PAJ Waddington’s (1995) observation about 
protesters who refuse to “play the game” being responded to differently by police, remains 
accurate despite changes to public order policing policy. Waddington argued that those protests 
which ‘deliberately place themselves beyond institutional boundaries in order to maximise 
disruption’ are ‘vulnerable to coercive policing strategies’ (1995: 11) and Barton Moss 
demonstrated that this is still the case. Crucially, it illustrates that the ‘human rights compliant 
model’ has not meant that the velvet glove of public order policing has replaced the iron fist 
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(Gilmore et al, 2017). However, the process by which specific protests or social movements 
are placed beyond institutional boundaries and deemed to be ‘breaking the rules’ needs to be 
better understood. Barton Moss suggests, along with other recent examples (Gilmore, 2010), 
that the process by which the rules of acceptable protest are broken, and a vulnerability to 
coercive policing created, cannot be reduced to protesters’ unwillingness to engage with police. 
There are examples where protesters (including at Barton Moss) do make an effort to play by 
the rules but are responded to with coercive policing. In addition, Barton Moss suggests that a 
commitment to peaceful, non-violent action on the part of protesters is not sufficient to ensure 
that the protest will be facilitated. This is because the boundaries between acceptable and 
unacceptable protest set by police are not based on the use of violence but on the target or goal 
of a protest and a desire to be disruptive; anti-fracking protest thus transcends the police 
definition of acceptable protest as ‘peaceful assembly’ not because of a recourse of violence 
but because of what it is focussed on, what it demands, and the form it takes. Seeking to 
challenge the status quo is enough to break the rules as a transgressive protest and anti-fracking 
protest is understood to pose a threat to security on these terms. The experience of anti-fracking 
protesters in England and Wales since 2013 suggests both that the police definitions position 
anti-fracking protest as unacceptable and that this is being reflected in operational policing. 
 
In conclusion, there is a need for further research into the policing of protest and into the 
reasons for the apparent differences in the responses to certain ‘types’ of protest. To do this, it 
is vital that research considers evolving definitions of acceptable protest in police policy. In 
addition, to enable us to consider a full range of protesters’ experiences it is vital that research 
engages with those protesters who voices remain underrepresented in policy, media, and 
academic discourse. The experiences of protesters who utilise direct action, and are placed, or 
place themselves, outside of the police definition of legitimate protest, should be considered, 
and must feed into debates about the developments in public order policing. The apparent 
differential in approaches to protest policing should be considered before we draw conclusions 
about general trends. That anti-fracking protest seems to be at the sharp end of a different 
emphasis in police policy and practice to that observed in many recent academic studies should 
have implications for future research into policing in the UK.  
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Notes 
i Although this document was published after ACPO was formally replaced by the NPCC in April 2015, the 
author was still listed as ACPO and is referred to in those terms in this article.  
ii A lock-on is a technique used by peaceful protesters to make it difficult to remove them from their place of 
protest. It often involves the use of improvised or specially designed and constructed hardware, although a 
basic lock-on is the human chain which relies simply on hand grip. 
iii. The public order command structure is based on the gold, silver, and bronze commander roles. While the 
roles are not specific to rank, the chain of command is usually the same as the order of rank. The Gold strategy 
is that implemented by the Gold (strategic) commander who assumes and retains overall command for a 
police operation or incident 
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